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THE LIMITS TO LIFE: WHAT THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN 
ABIGAIL ALLIANCE v. VON ESCHENBACH MEANS FOR MEDICAL 
FUTILITY STATUTES 
INTRODUCTION 
The specter of death is rarely met with open arms.  The sick are told by 
their friends and loved ones to fight their illnesses.  Even after an ill individual 
has become incapacitated and can no longer consent to the fight, the 
individual’s family often insists on continuing medical treatment.  Can a health 
care provider determine that medical resources should not be used to assist that 
fight if the provider decides that the fight is futile?  May a state legislature 
authorize providers to make that determination and act on it?  If a provider has 
made and implemented the decision to unilaterally terminate care pursuant to 
state legislative authorization, how should a court evaluate that decision if it is 
challenged? 
The decision to withdraw medical treatment with the understanding that 
death will shortly follow has received much recent attention,1 but the converse 
of the “right to die”2 exists in the denial of treatment sought to prolong life 
when a physician determines the treatment is simply prolonging a “biological 
organism and not . . . a ‘life.’”3  Such treatment falls under the category of 
medical futility.4  The majority of state legislatures have crafted statutes 
permitting health care providers to deny treatment to patients if the provider 
determines the treatment is medically inappropriate.5  While health care 
providers are largely unwilling to employ such statutes to unilaterally abandon 
or terminate treatment,6 the existence of such statutes indicates that state 
 
 1. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Not 
only has Mrs. Schiavo’s case been given due process, but few, if any, similar cases have ever 
been afforded this heightened level of process.” (quoting In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 916 
So.2d 814, 817 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005))). 
 2. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990) (“This is the 
first case in which we have been squarely presented with the issue whether the United States 
Constitution grants what is in common parlance referred to as a ‘right to die.’”). 
 3. Daniel Robert Mordarski, Comment, Medical Futility: Has Ending Life Support Become 
the Next “Pro-Choice/Right to Life” Debate?, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 751, 752 (1993). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to Unilaterally Refuse 
Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REV. 1, 1 (2007). 
 6. Id. at 4. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1322 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:1321 
legislatures have recognized public policies supporting the denial of life-
sustaining treatment in some circumstances. 
In Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach, an en banc D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed a previous decision by a panel of the court to hold that 
terminally ill individuals do not have a fundamental constitutional right to 
access experimental drugs not yet approved for widespread use by the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA).7  By upholding the limitations placed on 
public access to medicines as laid out in the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA) and FDA regulations enforcing those limitations, the court reaffirmed 
that “the democratic branches are better suited to decide the proper balance 
between the uncertain risks and benefits of medical technology.”8  The court 
concluded that a patient at the end of his or her life cannot claim a 
constitutional right to the treatment of his or her choosing if the federal 
legislature has restricted access to that treatment.9 
This Comment will discuss the role of courts in evaluating the availability 
of desired medical treatment for the terminally ill in the context of state 
medical futility statutes.  This Comment will argue that under the current 
models of state medical futility statutes, courts should not follow the D.C. 
Circuit’s deferential lead.  Part I examines the origins of medical futility 
disputes and courts’ involvement in such disputes.  Part II examines the 
genesis of state futility dispute statutes and the currently advocated process-
based model.  Part III focuses on the FDCA, the regulations promulgated by 
FDA under the FDCA, and the deference that courts have shown to FDA’s 
judgment in response to challenges to FDA regulations.  Part IV looks at the 
reasoning of the court in Abigail Alliance.  Finally, Part V provides a critical 
analysis of the D.C. Circuit’s decision and argues that the court’s deference to 
agency-placed limits on access to medical treatment in that case should not be 
followed by courts when evaluating current state medical futility statutes, as 
the current statutes entrust legislative interpretation to a small number of 
private individuals and do not allow for judicial oversight of that interpretation. 
I.  THE ORIGINS OF MEDICAL FUTILITY DISPUTES 
A. Medical Futility Generally 
A medical futility dispute emerges when a physician believes further 
treatment is no longer appropriate but the patient’s family or surrogate wants 
treatment continued.10  The family or surrogate might want treatment to be 
 
 7. 495 F.3d 695, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 8. Id. at 713. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Mordarski, supra note 3, at 752. 
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continued because they believe the physician’s prognosis is wrong, they are in 
denial about the patient’s realistic chances of recovery, or they believe a 
miracle will occur.11  Alternately, the physician might want treatment 
discontinued for reasons of professional integrity, due to concern for the 
patient’s well-being, so as to prevent the patient’s family from experiencing 
false hope, and to maximize limited health resources.12 
The concept of medical futility began with physician- or provider-
advocated withholding or withdrawal of life support systems or the removal of 
food and hydration from a patient in a prolonged vegetative state.13  Under 
such circumstances, the physician or provider found the prolonging of the 
patient’s life to be “legally, ethically and medically inappropriate.”14  In the 
1990s, professional medical associations, institutions, and providers began 
enacting policies and guidelines to allow providers to unilaterally discontinue 
“medically inappropriate” care even when the patient’s family or surrogate 
wants the treatment continued.15 
While the notion of treatment that constitutes “medical inappropriateness” 
in medical futility disputes was initially limited to providing life support or 
food and hydration to a patient in a persistent vegetative state, that definition 
has expanded.16  Now there is no consensus in the medical community, the 
bioethical community, or among the public as to what constitutes medical 
inappropriateness.17  Definitions of medical inappropriate care vary, often 
depending on the circumstances,18 and no definition of medical futility has 
been universally accepted.19 
The attempt to define medical futility in terms of clinical criteria has been 
considered the “first generation” of the medical futility debate.20  The 
narrowest definition of medical futility uses brain death as a standard for 
 
 11. Pope, supra note 5, at 10–11. 
 12. Id. at 15–18. 
 13. See Mordarski, supra note 3, at 752. 
 14. Cf. id. (noting that in early “right to die” cases physicians typically asserted that 
withholding or withdrawing life sustaining treatment was “legally, ethically and medically 
inappropriate”) 
 15. Pope, supra note 5, at 3–4. 
 16. See id. at 26. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Bryan Rowland, Comment, Communicating Past the Conflict: Solving the Medical 
Futility Controversy with Process-Based Approaches, 14 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 271, 
277 (2006) (quoting AscensionHealth.org, Health Care Ethics: Futility, http://www.ascension 
health.org/ethics/public/issues/futility.asp (last visited July 22, 2009)). 
 20. Jeffrey P. Burns & Robert D. Truog, Futility: A Concept in Evolution, 132 CHEST 1987, 
1988 (2007). 
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medical inappropriateness.21  Brain death is considered the only situation 
where medical intervention of any sort is considered futile,22 and “[t]here is a 
consensus that it is ethically, legally, and medically appropriate to stop 
[treatment] for a brain-dead patient.”23 
The next most restrictive definition of medical inappropriateness is 
physiological futility.24  Physiological futility refers to treatment that will 
produce no measurable effect on the patient, and such an evaluation is 
objective.25  Providers are able to determine physiological futility based on 
clinical knowledge, and “[e]ven the biggest opponents of unilateral decision 
making” would agree medical treatment with no physiological effect could be 
properly refused by a provider.26 
The last two definitions of futile care are more expansive.  Both definitions 
are subjective.  The first definition is a quantitative standard of futility, which 
depends upon a consensus of whether the treatment sought can achieve the 
patient’s goals for recovery.27  The second definition is a qualitative standard 
of futility, which depends upon the physician’s evaluation of whether the 
patient’s goals for recovery are worth pursuing.28  Qualitative futility is found 
in three forms: where the potential burdens to the patient outweigh the benefits 
to the patient, where the potential benefits to the patient are not worth the 
health care resources to be consumed, and where the treatment sought will not 
“provide the patient a quality of life worth living.”29 
The various definitions of medical futility have been debated for years, 
with only brain death and physiological futility supported by a consensus in the 
medical, legal, and bioethical communities.30  However, those communities 
 
 21. Robert D. Truog, Brain Death—Too Flawed to Endure, Too Ingrained to Abandon, 35 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 273, 276–77 (2007). 
 22. Id. at 277. 
 23. Pope, supra note 5, at 27. 
 24. Id. at 28. 
 25. Id. at 28–29. 
 26. Id. at 29–30. 
 27. Pope, supra note 5, at 32. 
 28. Id. at 34. 
 29. Id. at 35.  While the debate about medically inappropriate care did at one point 
contemplate a cost-benefits analysis of the treatment sought as a method for drawing the line at 
where treatment became futile, current evaluations of futility standards have been careful to 
differentiate between futility and rationing.  See Burns & Truog, supra note 20, at 1989–90 
(“[R]ationing arguments must always balance the benefits of a diagnostic or therapeutic 
intervention against its costs . . . . Futility arguments are fundamentally different, in that they 
claim that the intervention in question is devoid of benefit . . . . In light of this distinction, it 
should be clear that futility policies should never be invoked as a method of cost control.”); see 
also Rowland, supra note 19, at 279 (“Futility is not rationing health care.”).  This Comment will 
not discuss rationing as a form of evaluating medical futility. 
 30. Pope, supra note 5, at 41. 
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failed to arrive at a consensus on the definition of medical futility under other 
circumstances that more commonly give rise to medical futility disputes.31  
The lack of a universal definition of medical futility resulted in one hospital’s 
reluctance to terminate care even when such care met the hospital’s own 
definition of futility.32  Despite the presence of a futility policy, health care 
providers did not halt futile treatment.33  The ineffectiveness of this first 
generation of futility definitions led to another model for approaching the 
definition of futility. 
Identifying medical futility disputes through a defined set of procedural 
steps has been considered the “second generation” of the medical futility 
debate.34  Under this approach, hospitals use an internal ethics committees to 
determine if the treatment sought by a patient’s surrogate is futile and then 
follow a defined set of steps that can lead to unilateral termination of care if no 
agreement with the family can be reached or alternate arrangements can be 
made.35  If the ethics committee supports the physicians’ view that treatment is 
futile, the hospital negotiates with the patient’s family to attempt to arrive at a 
consensus for continued care.36  If such a consensus cannot be reached, the 
hospital will try to transfer the patient to a facility that will provide the care 
sought.37  If such a provider cannot be found, the hospital could try to have an 
alternate surrogate appointed by a court, with the assumption that the alternate 
surrogate will be more amenable to negotiation.38  If the attempt to appoint an 
alternate surrogate is unsuccessful, the hospital could unilaterally withdraw 
care.39  Many hospitals nationwide have adopted the procedural approach as 
hospital policy.40  As part of hospital policy, the decision to unilaterally 
terminate care is open to challenge through the legal system.41 
 
 31. Id. at 41–42. 
 32. See Burns & Truog, supra note 20, at 1989–88. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 1989. 
 35. Pope, supra note 5, at 23.  While there are no set requirements for the membership of a 
hospital ethics committee, membership of such committees typically consists of doctors, nurses, 
and other hospital employees.  Burns & Truog, supra note 20, at 1990–91.  Most committees also 
have non-medical personnel members from the local community, but “these are often grateful 
former patients of the hospital.”  Id. 
 36. Burns & Truog, supra note 20, at 1989. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Burns & Truog, supra note 20, at 1989.  These challenges could arise in the form of 
civil, criminal, and disciplinary sanctions.  Pope, supra note 5, at 43.  Common civil claims filed 
against providers after the unilateral termination of treatment include actions for informed 
consent, medical malpractice, and wrongful death.  Id.  Common criminal charges filed against 
providers include patient neglect and murder.  Id. at 47.  Disciplinary sanctions against a provider 
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The American Medical Association (AMA) endorsed a process-based 
approach in 1999, noting that “definitions of futile care are value laden” and 
that “universal consensus on futility care is unlikely to be achieved.”42  The 
process recommended by the AMA involved seven steps in total, “aimed at 
deliberation and resolution including all involved parties, . . . securing 
alternatives in the case of irreconcilable differences, and . . . closure when all 
alternatives have been exhausted.”43 
Prior to the enactment of state medical futility statutes, many professional 
medical associations, health care providers, and institutions decided that it 
would be appropriate for providers to withhold or withdraw treatment 
unilaterally in cases of medical disputes and enacted policies reflecting this 
determination.44  These policies took the form of both clinical definitions of 
futile care and process-based approaches to resolving medical futility disputes.  
As hospital policies, any decision arrived at by the treating physician or the 
hospital ethics committee was open to judicial challenge by the patient’s 
family or surrogate.45  As such, despite the presence of these policies, 
providers were still reluctant to act for fear of the legal repercussions.46  In 
response, state legislatures began passing medical futility statutes to offer 
providers that protection.47 
B. Medical Futility Cases Prior to State Statutes: Hospital Ethics 
Committees 
There are limited court judgments evaluating health care providers’ 
decisions to unilaterally withhold or terminate treatment prior to the enactment 
of state medical futility statutes.48  Under such circumstances, the providers 
were relying upon their own policies authorizing the unilateral removal or 
cessation of treatment.49  In the absence of state statutes protecting unilateral 
treatment decisions, providers often depended on the evaluation of a hospital’s 
ethics committee to buttress the treating physician’s determination that the care 
 
typically include damages under state health care decision statutes for failing to comply with 
patient and surrogate decisions when “intentional statutory violations occur.”  Id. at 49. 
 42. Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass’n, Medical Futility in End-of-Life 
Care: Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, 281 JAMA 937, 937 (1999). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Pope, supra note 5, at 3–4. 
 45. Burns & Truog, supra note 20, at 1989. 
 46. Pope, supra note 5, at 4. 
 47. See Id. at 53; see also Rowland, supra note 19, at 308 (discussing the Texas Advanced 
Directive Act of 1999). 
 48. See Mordarski, supra note 3, at 762. 
 49. Pope, supra note 5, at 3–4. 
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sought by the patient’s surrogate was medically inappropriate.50  The support 
for the doctor’s determination would be used to attempt to sway the patient’s 
surrogate to accede to the withdrawal or termination of treatment.51  While 
process-based hospital policies required the use of an ethics committee to 
arrive at the determination that treatment sought was futile, hospitals 
employing policies involving a clinical definition of futility also often used 
ethics committees. 
If an ethics committee was involved in the decision to unilaterally halt 
treatment, the decision was used by hospitals as evidence in lawsuits brought 
by surrogates objecting to that decision.  The decision of the ethics committee 
was often convincing to a judge or jury.  In Gilgunn v. Massachusetts General 
Hospital, the daughter of a deceased elderly patient sued Massachusetts 
General Hospital after the hospital disconnected her comatose father’s life 
support in violation of her instructions.52  After the hospital presented evidence 
that the treating physician had obtained an ethics consultation and the 
subsequent approval of the head of the ethics committee to remove life 
support, a jury refused to award damages against the hospital.53 
The evaluation of an ethics committee is not always persuasive.  In Rideout 
v. Hershey Medical Center, the court imposed liability on a hospital for ending 
life support for an incompetent patient in violation of the surrogate’s wishes.54  
In Rideout, the parents of a two-year-old girl who had a malignant tumor in her 
brain brought a wrongful death action after the treating physician determined 
her condition was incurable and deteriorating, and therefore, unilaterally 
removed her ventilator.55  The physician had the approval of the hospital’s 
ethics committee,56 but the court nonetheless found the hospital liable for the 
patient’s death.57 
Similarly, the evaluation of an ethics committee is not always considered 
useful for evaluating the issue before the court in a dispute relating to medical 
futility.  The court in In re Howe found the ethics committee’s evaluation of 
futility irrelevant to its decision of whether to remove the patient’s surrogate 
from her role.58  In Howe, the court ordered the surrogate of a patient suffering 
 
 50. Norman L. Cantor, Twenty-Five Years After Quinlan: A Review of the Jurisprudence of 
Death and Dying, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 182, 185 (2001). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See id. 
 54. Rideout v. Hershey Med. Ctr., 30 Pa. D. & C. 4th 57, 83–84 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1995); see 
also Cantor, supra note 50, at 186 (discussing the Rideout case). 
 55. Rideout, 30 Pa. D & C 4th at 59–62. 
 56. Id. at 62. 
 57. Id. at 70; see also Cantor, supra note 50, at 186. 
 58. In re Howe, No. 03-P-1255, 2004 WL 1446057, at *20–21 (Mass. Prob. & Fam. Ct. 
Dept. Mar. 22, 2004). 
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from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis to make her decisions based on an 
assessment of the patient’s best interests.59  The court felt that there was 
insufficient evidence to find that the surrogate, who was the patient’s sister, 
should be removed for insisting on life-sustaining treatment even after the 
hospital determined that the treatment demanded was inappropriate.60  While 
the court did not determine whether the treatment demanded by the surrogate 
was inappropriate or that the hospital must conform to the surrogate’s wishes, 
it did not defer to the ethics committee’s evaluation.  The patient’s surrogate 
and the hospital eventually arrived at an agreement to extend aggressive life-
sustaining care, and the patient died less than a month before treatment was 
scheduled to be terminated.61 
The court in Causey v. St. Francis Medical Center62 also found the hospital 
ethics committee’s futility determination irrelevant to the issue before it.  In 
Causey, the court held that a physician’s liability for unilaterally removing life 
support from a comatose patient depended on whether the physician deviated 
from the standard of care.63  While the hospital’s Morals and Ethics Board 
agreed with the physician’s decision to discontinue life-support treatment, the 
court found that the complaint raised by the patient’s surrogate must first be 
submitted to a medical review panel for a determination of whether the 
physician and the Board departed from the prevailing standard of care.64  The 
court found such determination required under the Louisiana Medical 
Malpractice Act, rendering the surrogate’s claim premature without it.65 
In some situations the ethics committee will not go along with the treating 
physician’s determination that medical care is inappropriate.66  In In re Helga 
Wanglie, a hospital sought a judicial determination that it could change the 
guardian for a permanently comatose patient after the guardian, the patient’s 
husband, insisted on the continuation of life support.67  Prior to seeking judicial 
assistance, the hospital’s ethics committee evaluated the situation and 
concluded that the hospital staff should continue treatment.68  The judge 
 
 59. Id. at *21. 
 60. Id. at *20–21. 
 61. Richard Moore, An End-of-Life Quandary in Need of a Statutory Response: When 
Patients Demand Life-Sustaining Treatment that Physicians Are Unwilling to Provide, 48 B.C. L. 
REV. 433, 467 (2007). 
 62. Causey v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So. 2d 1072 (La. Ct. App. 1998). 
 63. Id. at 1076. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Mordarski, supra note 3, at 763–64. 
 67. See id. at 764–65 (discussing In re Helga Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Hennepin County, 
Minn., 4th Dist. Ct., P. Ct. Div. July 1, 1991) (unreported opinion)); see also Cantor, supra note 
50, at 185. 
 68. Mordarski, supra note 3, at 763–64. 
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determined that the husband would remain as guardian and life support was 
continued.69 
Finally, prior to the enactment of medical futility statutes, not all cases 
relating to the cessation of treatment involved a hospital ethics committee’s 
determination.  In Velez v. Bethune, the court held that a physician had no right 
to independently decide to discontinue the medical treatment of an infant even 
if the child was terminally ill and about to die.70  The child was born on the 
side of a highway after a twenty-four week gestation period and died nine days 
later, after the treating physician ordered the discontinuation of resuscitation.71  
The mother of the child alleged in her complaint that the treating physician 
discontinued medical care without discussing the decision with her or the 
child’s father.72  The court made no mention of the involvement of an ethics 
committee in the physician’s decision to halt treatment, and the court found 
that the treating physician could not decide on his own to terminate medical 
treatment of the child.73 
Medical futility disputes arise when a health care provider determines that 
treatment desired by a patient or the patient’s surrogate is not medically 
appropriate.  Before the enactment of state statutes authorizing providers to 
unilaterally deny or terminate medically inappropriate treatment, providers did 
decide to restrict such treatment.  These decisions were made pursuant to 
hospital policies that often included consultations with a hospital ethics 
committee in an attempt to persuade the patient or surrogate to agree to the 
cessation of treatment.  In the few situations where a physician halted life 
support and the patient’s surrogate took the issue to court, the decisions of 
hospital ethics committees were given varying weight in the courts’ final 
decision and were not always dispositive.  Thus, a hospital seeking to 
discontinue medically inappropriate care could not depend on the treating 
physician’s evaluation, the ethic committee’s determination, or the authority of 
its own policies to withstand judicial scrutiny. 
II.  THE ENACTMENT OF STATE FUTILITY STATUTES 
A. The Different Types of State Futility Statutes 
In the early 1990s, many states enacted legislation allowing health care 
providers to unilaterally refuse to provide treatment that they consider 
medically inappropriate.74  Prior to the enactment of medical futility statutes, 
 
 69. Id. at 764. 
 70. Velez v. Bethune, 466 S.E.2d 627, 629 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). 
 71. Id. at 628. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 629. 
 74. Pope, supra note 5, at 50. 
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commentators had argued for their establishment.75  These statutes have taken 
several different forms. 
1. The Uniform Health Care Decisions Act 
The Uniform Health Care Decisions Act (UHCDA) was drafted in 1993 to 
allow an individual to preemptively create a plan to specify what health care he 
or she would desire in all situations and to resolve state conflicts in advance 
health-care directives.76  In addition to permitting the individual to decline 
treatment or request that treatment be discontinued, the UHCDA authorized a 
health care provider to decline to honor a request for treatment “for reasons of 
conscience or if the instruction or decision requires the provision of medically 
ineffective care or care contrary to applicable health-care standards.”77  No 
other definition of “medically ineffective care or care contrary to applicable 
health-care standards” is given by the UHCDA.  The UHCDA has been 
adopted by more states than any other model of state futility statute.78  After it 
was completed, the UHCDA was codified by ten states over the course of the 
next twelve years.79 
The UHCDA outlines a process that a health care provider must follow if it 
wishes to unilaterally terminate a patient’s treatment.80  First, the provider 
informs the patient or surrogate that it wishes to terminate the treatment.81  
Second, the provider must “immediately make all reasonable efforts” to 
transfer the patient to another provider willing to continue the treatment 
requested, while the current provider still continues supplying the treatment.82  
 
 75. See, e.g., Mordarski, supra note 3, at 783 (“Although the issue of communication and 
medical futility is best resolved within the medical community itself, if the medical community 
does not accept this responsibility, then each state legislature should become involved.”). 
 76. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT §§ 1–19, 9 U.L.A. 83–129 (2005 & Supp. 2008), 
reprinted in 22 ISSUES L. & MED. 83, 83 (2006).  The Act was recommended for enactment in all 
states at the annual meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, held from July 30 to August 6, 1993, and was approved by the American Bar Association 
on February 7, 1994. 
 77. Id. at 83–84. 
 78. Pope, supra note 5, at 53. 
 79. Id. at 53; see also ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -13 (LexisNexis 2006); ALASKA STAT. 
§§ 13.52.010 to .395 (2006); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4600 –4806 (West Supp. 2008); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 16 §§ 2501–2518 (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 327E-1 to -16 (2008); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 18 §§ 5-801 to -817 (Supp. 2007); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-201 to -229 
(2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7A-1 to -18 (Supp. 2006); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-11-1801 to -
1815 (2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-22-401 to -416 (2007). 
 80. Pope, supra note 5, at 54. 
 81. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 7(g), 9 U.L.A. 118–19. 
 82. Id.  The provider’s inability to find another provider willing to continue treatment 
“serves as a check on the system to be sure that the hospital’s position is not out of line with 
medical standards within the community at large.”  Burns & Truog, supra note 20, at 1989.  This 
then serves to establish the standard of care for the patient.  The plaintiff in a medical malpractice 
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If the provider is unable to find another provider to take the patient, however, 
then the provider may refuse the treatment request.83  The patient or surrogate 
may petition the courts for judicial relief to “enjoin or direct a health-care 
decision or order other equitable relief” if the patient or surrogate disagrees 
with the decision made.84 
2. Other State Futility Statutes 
The UHCDA is not the only form of state futility statute.  Other states have 
adopted statutes authorizing the unilateral withholding or withdrawal of 
medically inappropriate treatment by a health care provider.  Other state 
futility statutes can be distinguished by their various definitions of what 
constitutes medically inappropriate treatment.85  Some statutes provide no 
definition of medical inappropriateness.86  Most statutes offer some definition 
of medical inappropriateness, including definitions based on “usual and 
customary standards of medical practice,”87 “reasonable medical standards,”88 
“responsible medical practice,”89 and “accepted medical standards.”90 
Still other states have medical futility statutes in place that are considered 
“narrow” statutes.91  These statutes permit unilateral decisions in carefully 
defined circumstances.92  These statutes offer tighter restrictions on the type of 
treatment that can be discontinued, what the expected effect of the treatment 
must be before it can be discontinued, and the extent to which a provider may 
take action where a surrogate has requested treatment.93 
 
case must prove the standard of medical care and show that the defendant-physician departed 
from that standard of care in treating the plaintiff.  Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Standard of Care 
Owed to Patient by Medical Specialist As Determined by Local, “Like Community,” State, 
National, or Other Standards, 18 A.L.R. 4th 603, 606–07 (1982).  If the hospital can show that 
other area hospitals refused to treat the patient in the manner requested, the hospital can establish 
that it did not deviate from the relevant standard of care by refusing to treat the patient in the 
manner requested and can therefore rebut a charge of medical malpractice. Id. 
 83. See Pope, supra note 5, at 60–61; see UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 7(e)–(g) at 
118–19 (noting that a provider who refuses to continue medically ineffective care “shall . . . 
provide continuing care to the patient until a transfer can be effected”). 
 84. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 14, 9 U.L.A. 125, 129. 
 85. Pope, supra note 5, at 57. 
 86. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.1(A)(4) (2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-
2990(A) (2005). 
 87. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-571(a)(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2009). 
 88. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-10(3) (2006 & Supp. 2008); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
45/4-8(c) (2008). 
 89. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:7(I) (LexisNexis 2006). 
 90. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-31-2 (LexisNexis 2006). 
 91. Pope, supra note 5, at 64. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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First, with regards to the type of treatment that can be discontinued, some 
“narrow” statutes authorize providers to unilaterally withhold only CPR.94  
Other statutes authorize providers to unilaterally withhold only “artificially 
administered nutrition and hydration.”95 
Second, with regards to the expected effect of the treatment sought to be 
discontinued, some statutes authorize providers to make unilateral decisions 
only under certain definitions of medical inappropriateness.96  These 
definitions include situations involving brain death, physiological futility, or 
permanent unconsciousness.97 
Finally, with regards to the extent to which a provider may take action 
where a surrogate has requested treatment, some statutes authorize providers to 
unilaterally withhold or withdraw treatment only when neither the patient nor 
the patient’s surrogate has provided opposing directions.98 
B. Court Challenges to State Futility Statutes 
Since state medical futility statutes are a recent phenomenon, and given 
that health care providers are still reluctant to take unilateral action despite the 
presence of such statutes, few cases deal with challenges to state medical 
futility statutes after a provider has terminated treatment in opposition to a 
surrogate’s wishes. 
1. Direct Challenges to State Medical Futility Statutes 
Hudson v. Texas Children’s Hospital99 was the first case in which a court 
upheld a provider’s decision to withdraw life-sustaining care while the patient 
was still alive on the basis of a state medical futility statute.100  In Hudson, the 
mother of an infant born with thanatophoric dysplasia sought an injunction to 
require the hospital to continue providing life-sustaining care to her child.101 
Thanatophoric dysplasia, a rare and fatal type of dwarfism,102 required the 
child to be placed on a ventilator.103  The child’s treating physicians 
determined that continuing treatment was inappropriate.104  The hospital’s 
 
 94. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9708 (2007). 
 95. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.580 (2007). 
 96. Pope, supra note 5, at 65. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.580. 
 99. 177 S.W.3d 232, 238 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (remanding the case following the trial 
judge’s refusal to recuse himself). On remand, the trial judge refused to issue an injunction to 
force the hospital to continue medical care. Moore, supra note 61, at 461. 
 100. Moore, supra note 61, at 466. 
 101. Hudson, 177 S.W.3d at 233. 
 102. Moore, supra note 61, at 461. 
 103. Hudson, 177 S.W.3d at 233. 
 104. Id. 
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bioethics committee agreed with the decision and informed the mother that the 
hospital would discontinue treatment within ten days unless she found another 
hospital willing to provide care.105 
The process followed by the hospital was done in accordance with the 
Texas Advance Directives Act106 (Texas Act), which sets out a process-based 
approach for medical futility decisions.107  Under that approach, the hospital 
informs the patient’s surrogate of the physicians’ adverse decision; reviews the 
decision using the hospital’s ethics committee; if the committee supports the 
adverse decision, the hospital assists the surrogate in finding a facility willing 
to provide treatment; and ultimately, if such a facility cannot be found, the 
physician terminates treatment.108 
While the mother in Hudson brought claims under several federal and state 
statutes, the only claim that survived the hospital’s motion for summary 
judgment was her claim for injunctive relief under the Texas Act.109  If 
granted, the injunction sought in Hudson would have forced the hospital to 
continue providing life-sustaining care for a period longer than the statutory 
period required while the hospital searched for another willing provider.110  
This is the only remedy available under the Texas Act.111  The trial judge 
entered a temporary restraining order preventing the hospital from halting 
treatment during the ensuing litigation, but ultimately denied her injunction.112  
Although a procedural error by the judge led to an appeal and reversal of his 
denial, on remand the trial judge affirmed the denial.113  The hospital withdrew 
the life-sustaining treatment, and the child died moments afterwards.114 
2. Federal Preemption Under EMTALA 
Other judicial evaluations of state futility statutes have found such statutes 
preempted by federal law.  For example, In re Baby K the court found that the 
treatment requirements of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor 
Act (EMTALA) superseded a state futility statute.115  In Baby K, the court held 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.001 to .166 (Vernon 2001 & Supp. 2008). 
 107. Moore, supra note 61, at 462. 
 108. Id. at 459–60. 
 109. Hudson, 177 S.W.3d at 234. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See § 166.046(g). 
 112. Hudson, 177 S.W.3d at 235. 
 113. Moore, supra note 61, at 461. 
 114. Id. 
 115. In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 597 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Emergency Medical Treatment 
and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006) [hereinafter EMTALA].  The EMTALA 
statute states: 
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that a hospital was required to provide stabilizing treatment to an infant even 
though the hospital considered the treatment medically inappropriate.116  In its 
argument for discontinuing care, the hospital relied on the Health Care 
Decisions Act of Virginia, which provided that “[n]othing in this article shall 
be construed to require a physician to prescribe or render medical treatment to 
a patient that the physician determines to be medically or ethically 
inappropriate.”117  The hospital in Baby K also attacked its obligations under 
EMTALA, arguing its duties to provide adequate screening and stabilization of 
emergency care patients under that Act did not include the care sought by Baby 
K’s mother.118 
In Baby K, the hospital sought a declaratory judgment that it was not 
required to provide treatment other than nutrition, hydration, and warmth to an 
anencephalic infant.119  Anencephaly is a condition in which a child is born 
without major portions of the brain, skull, and scalp.120  Baby K did have a 
brain stem, enabling her to perform basic physiological functions, but she 
lacked a cerebrum and was therefore permanently unconscious.121  Baby K’s 
treating physician explained to her mother that life support services were 
inappropriate, but her mother insisted that the doctors continue providing Baby 
K with mechanical breathing assistance when she had trouble breathing on her 
own.122  Baby K was discharged to a nursing home, but she was readmitted 
three times to the emergency room after she had trouble breathing.123  The 
hospital sought the declaratory judgment after Baby K’s second admission.124 
The court in Baby K upheld the duties required by EMTALA over the 
hospital’s right to terminate care it found medically inappropriate.125  The court 
in Baby K found that the hospital’s desire to withhold care conflicted with the 
 
In the case of a hospital that has a hospital emergency department, if any individual 
. . . comes to the emergency department and a request is made on the individual’s behalf 
for examination or treatment . . . , the hospital must provide for an appropriate medical 
screening examination . . . . 
. . . [A]nd [if] the hospital determines that the individual has an emergency medical 
condition, the hospital must provide either . . . for such further medical examination and 
such treatment as may be required to stabilize the medical condition, or for transfer of the 
individual to another medical facility . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)–(b)(1). 
 116. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 597–98. 
 117. Id. at 597 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990 (2005)). 
 118. Id. at 595. 
 119. Id. at 592. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 592. 
 122. Id. at 592–93. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 598. 
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hospital’s duty to provide stabilizing treatment for Baby K under EMTALA.126  
The court determined that Virginia’s state medical futility statute was 
preempted in this situation by EMTALA.127 
Other judicial decisions have subsequently clarified the decision of the 
court in Baby K and noted that EMTALA was not intended to govern medical 
care beyond that which was required to immediately stabilize a patient seeking 
emergency care.  In Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of University of Virginia, the 
same court that decided Baby K again addressed the issue of a whether a 
hospital’s unilateral decision to terminate a patient’s care violated 
EMTALA.128  In Bryan, the court held that a hospital’s decision to enter an 
anti-resuscitation order for an elderly patient and then not resuscitate the 
patient after her heart attack eight days later did not violate EMTALA.129  The 
patient had been admitted to the hospital emergency room with respiratory 
distress, and twelve days after her admittance the hospital staff entered a “do 
not resuscitate” order for her against her family’s wishes.130  The court in 
Bryan found that Congress intended EMTALA “to regulate the hospital’s care 
of the patient only in the immediate aftermath of the act of admitting her for 
emergency treatment” and could not “plausibly be interpreted to regulate 
medical and ethical decisions outside that narrow context.”131 
In re AMB, the Michigan Court of Appeals similarly strictly construed the 
emergency care requirements of EMTALA.132  The court in AMB held that a 
family court improperly entered an order withdrawing life support from a 
premature infant, Baby Allison, because the court failed to properly notify 
Baby Allison’s parents.133  After life support had been withdrawn and the child 
had died, attorneys representing the Family Independence Agency of the 
family court and Baby Allison agreed to present arguments to the court to 
“clarify the record and examine the issues.”134  When evaluating the claim that 
the family court’s order to withdraw life support from Baby Allison violated 
the hospital’s duty to provide stabilization under EMTALA, the court 
distinguished the situation in Baby K from Baby Allison’s circumstances.135  
The court noted that Baby Allison was never admitted for emergency care and 
that the hospital did not try to treat Baby Allison any differently than other 
 
 126. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 597. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 95 F.3d 349, 349–50 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 129. Id. at 350–51. 
 130. Id. at 350. 
 131. Id. at 352. 
 132. In re AMB, 640 N.W.2d 262, 286 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001). 
 133. Id. at 311. 
 134. Id. at 275. 
 135. Id. at 289. 
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patients requiring her treatment.136  The court found EMTALA inapplicable for 
other reasons, noting that “[t]he standards EMTALA puts in place affecting 
treatment specifically control hospital conduct, not patient autonomy or 
decisions by appropriate surrogates.”137  Despite the ruling of the court in Baby 
K, that EMTALA preempted a state medical statute, the subsequent decisions 
of Bryan and AMB indicate a judicial unwillingness to extend EMTALA 
beyond Congress’ stated purpose of prohibiting patient-dumping. 
3. Other Federal Preemption Challenges to Medical Futility Statutes 
Despite the lack of litigation contesting state medical futility statutes, 
commentators have recognized other potential federal preemption issues with 
regards to state medical futility statutes apart from EMTALA.  Among these 
challenges is unconstitutionality.138  The unilateral termination of treatment 
may violate a patient’s First Amendment rights if the patient or surrogate 
demands treatment based on religious convictions.139  A patient’s Eighth 
Amendment rights may be violated if the patient is a prisoner and thus such 
termination may be considered cruel and unusual punishment.140  It has been 
argued that “unilateral termination is inconsistent with equal protection, the 
right to life, and the freedom of expression.”141  It has also been held that the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the unilateral 
discontinuation of medical treatment.142 
C. Current State Futility Statutes 
Despite the risk of federal preemption under EMTALA or the risk of 
unconstitutionality, state medical futility statutes are still being employed.  The 
state that has had the most success with its futility statute is Texas; assuming 
that success is measured as the ability of a provider to lean on the state’s 
medical futility statute as a means of unilaterally terminating treatment.143  
Texas employs a process-based futility statute.144 
At the first stage, an ethics committee reviews the treating physician’s 
decision that continuing treatment would be inappropriate.145  The patient’s 
surrogate must be notified forty-eight hours before the review and is entitled to 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. AMB, 640 N.W.2d at 289. 
 138. Pope, supra note 5, at 77. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Pope, supra note 5, at 1. 
 144. Id. at 79; see also supra text accompanying notes 107–108. 
 145. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046(a) (Vernon 2001 & Supp. 2008). 
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attend the meeting and receive a written explanation of the committee’s 
decision.146 
The second stage begins after the ethics committee decides to terminate 
treatment.  At this stage, the provider must try to transfer the patient to a 
provider that is willing to continue treatment.147  The provider must continue to 
provide the treatment sought throughout the first and second stages and for ten 
days after the ethics committee hands down its decision to the patient’s 
surrogate.148  If the provider cannot find a provider willing to continue the 
treatment, the provider may unilaterally stop treatment on the eleventh day.149 
Under the Texas statute, a patient’s surrogate cannot challenge the decision 
of the hospital ethics committee in court.150  The only judicial recourse 
available for a surrogate is an injunction to extend the ten-day period after the 
provider determines that it will end treatment.151  The court is permitted to 
extend the time period “only if the court finds, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that there is a reasonable expectation that a physician or health care 
facility that will honor the patient’s directive will be found if the time 
extension is granted.”152  Under Texas law, then, a hospital ethics committee’s 
evaluation that a treatment sought is futile is a final decision on the merits. 
Commentators have suggested that the reason Texas’s state medical futility 
statute has been so effective is because it is focused on a definite process.153  
While other state statutes rely on imprecise standards to identify “medically 
inappropriate” medicine, Texas’s statute defines a provider’s duty solely in 
terms of process and is the only state statute to do so.154  Accordingly, Texas’s 
statute is considered the only effective state medical futility statute,155 and its 
process-based approach is considered the best method for resolving medical 
futility disputes.156  Several commentators have argued that other states should 
model their medical futility statutes on Texas’s.157 
 
 146. Id. § 166.046(b). 
 147. Id. § 166.046(d). 
 148. Id. § 166.046(e). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Burns & Truog, supra note 20, at 1991. 
 151. See id.; see also § 166.046(g). 
 152. § 166.046(g). 
 153. Pope, supra note 5, at 80. 
 154. Id. at 1, 80. 
 155. Id. at 1. 
 156. Moore, supra note 61, at 468; see also Rowland, supra note 19, at 274. 
 157. Rowland, supra note 19, at 309; see also Pope, supra note 5, at 1. 
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III.  THE FOOD, DRUG AND COSMETIC ACT: THE ENACTMENT OF THE FDCA, 
FDA REGULATIONS, AND CHALLENGES TO BOTH 
A. The Legislative History of the FDCA 
The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) was passed by Congress in 
1938 “[t]o prohibit the movement in interstate commerce of adulterated and 
misbranded food, drugs, devices, and cosmetics, and for other purposes.”158  In 
1962, the FDCA was amended to add specific requirements that must be met 
before the drugs receive approval by FDA.159  The amendments were enacted 
“[t]o protect the public health by amending the [FDCA] to assure the safety, 
effectiveness, and reliability of drugs, authorize standardization of drug names, 
and clarify and strengthen existing inspection authority; and for other 
purposes.”160  These 1962 amendments to the FDCA were at issue in Abigail 
Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach.161 
Under the FDCA, “[n]o person shall introduce . . . into interstate 
commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application [is] filed . . . 
with respect to such a drug.”162  Such an application will not be approved by 
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare in the absence of “adequate 
tests by all methods reasonably applicable to show whether or not such drug is 
safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested,” if 
“the results of such tests . . . do not show that such drug is safe for use under 
such conditions,” if there is “insufficient information to determine whether 
such drug is safe for use under such conditions,” or if “the information 
submitted . . . as part of the application . . . [shows] a lack of substantial 
evidence that the drug will have the effect it purports.”163 
To meet the requirements of the FDCA, FDA promulgated detailed 
regulations that must be followed by the proponent of a new drug.  The current 
FDA approval process that a new drug must undergo before it can be marketed 
to the general public has three basic phases.164  A fourth post-marketing 
investigational phase may be conducted to ascertain additional information 
about the “drug’s risks, benefits, and optimal use.”165  An investigational new 
 
 158. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 717, 52 Stat. 1040, 1040 (1938) (codified as 
amended at scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 159. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006). 
 160. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780, 780 (codified as amended 
at scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 161. 495 F.3d 695, 705. (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 162. 21 U.S.C. §355(a). 
 163. Id. § 355(d). 
 164. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2008). 
 165. Id. § 312.85. 
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drug application (IND) may be submitted for clinical investigation in one or 
more phases.166 
The approval process begins when a drug sponsor submits an IND to FDA, 
indicating that the sponsor intends to conduct clinical studies on an 
investigational drug.167  A sponsor “may be an individual or pharmaceutical 
company, governmental agency, academic institution, private organization, or 
other organization.”168  The IND must include the sponsor’s general plan for 
investigation and the protocols intended to be followed for human testing.169  
FDA has set out a specific and detailed format that an IND must take,170 and a 
sponsor must annually report on an IND to describe the status of current 
studies and update the plan for the upcoming year.171  An IND goes into effect 
and authorizes a sponsor to begin its investigation thirty days after FDA 
receives the IND, unless FDA notifies the sponsor that a clinical hold has been 
placed on the IND, or on earlier notification to the sponsor that the 
investigation can begin.172 
In the first phase, the investigational new drug is introduced to human 
subjects in studies on patients or volunteer subjects.173  The total number of 
subjects in a Phase 1 study is typically between twenty and eighty.174  Phase 1 
studies are designed to evaluate how the drug affects humans, “the side effects 
associated with increasing doses,” and “gain early evidence on [the drug’s] 
effectiveness.”175  To pass on to Phase 2, Phase 1 studies must gather an 
adequate amount of “information about the drug’s pharmacokinetics and 
pharmacological effects.”176  In addition to studies evaluating the drug’s side 
effects, Phase 1 also includes separate studies that evaluate “drug metabolism, 
structure-activity relationships, and mechanism of action in humans” and 
“explore biological phenomena or disease processes” through use of the 
investigational new drug as a research tool.177 
In the second phase, the investigational new drug is subject to more “well-
controlled, scientifically valid . . . studies.”178  The total number of subjects in 
 
 166. Id. § 312.21. 
 167. Id. § 312.20(a). 
 168. Id. § 312.3(b). 
 169. 21 C.F.R. § 312.22(c). 
 170. Id. § 312.23. 
 171. Id. § 312.22(c). 
 172. Id. § 312.40(b)(1)–(2). 
 173. Id. § 312.21(a)(1). 
 174. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a)(1). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. § 312.21(a)(2). 
 178. Id. § 312.21(a)(1). 
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a Phase 2 study is typically no more than several hundred.179  Phase 2 studies 
are used “to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug for a particular indication” 
in patients afflicted “with the disease or condition under study”.180 
To reach the third and usually final phase, there must be “preliminary 
evidence suggesting effectiveness of the drug.”181  Once such evidence has 
been obtained, Phase 3 studies expand the previous studies into controlled and 
uncontrolled studies.182  The total number of subjects in Phase 3 studies is 
typically between several hundred and several thousand.183  The purpose of 
Phase 3 studies is to collect the information required “to evaluate the overall 
benefit-risk relationship of the drug and to provide an adequate basis for 
physician labeling.”184 
Throughout the three basic phases of the FDA approval process, FDA 
reviews the IND.185  FDA’s purpose is to monitor “the safety and rights of [the 
human] subjects” in Phase I and “help assure that the quality of the scientific 
evaluation of drugs is adequate to permit an evaluation of the drug’s 
effectiveness and safety” in Phases 2 and 3.186  If at any point FDA feels that a 
deficiency exists in a clinical investigation, FDA will try to resolve the matter 
with the sponsor or place a clinical hold on the IND.187  Once a drug receives 
FDA approval by passing through all phases of FDA’s specified process, the 
drug’s sponsor may begin to market it to the general public.188 
B. Judicial Challenges to the FDCA 
The FDCA has previously been challenged by groups desiring earlier 
access to investigational drugs making their way through the FDA approval 
process.  These challenges have helped shape an understanding of the 
regulatory approval process outlined by FDA to put the text of the FDCA into 
action and to what extent a drug sponsor or drug consumer may oppose the 
process. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Rutherford examined the 
application of the FDA approval process to drugs for the terminally ill.189  In 
Rutherford, the Supreme Court held that there is no express or implicit 
exemption from the approval process in the FDCA for drugs going to 
 
 179. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b). 
 180. Id. § 312.21(b). 
 181. Id. § 312.21(c). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. 21 C.F.R. § 312.22(a). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. § 312.42(c)–(d). 
 188. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006). 
 189. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 546 (1979). 
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terminally ill patients.190  The plaintiffs in Rutherford, a group of terminally ill 
individuals and their spouses filed suit to enjoin FDA from interfering with the 
shipment and sale of laetrile, a drug that had not yet undergone the full FDA 
approval process.191  The issue directly before the Court in Rutherford was 
whether the safety and efficacy standards of the FDCA were relevant to the 
terminally ill and if there was therefore an implied exemption to the statute for 
the terminally ill.192  The Court found that the objectives of the approval 
process as noted in the FDCA—namely, assurances that a drug is safe and 
effective—were still applicable to those drugs sought by patients who are 
terminally ill.193  The Court noted that “federal courts do not sit as councils of 
revision, empowered to rewrite legislation in accord with their own 
conceptions of prudent public policy.”194  The Court further stated that 
“[w]hether, as a policy matter, an exemption should be created is a question for 
legislative judgment, not judicial inference.”195 
The Court’s decision in Rutherford was also affected by the “substantial 
deference” given “the construction of a statute by those charged with its 
administration”—in this case, FDA.196  The Court found “[s]uch deference is 
particularly appropriate where, as here, an agency’s interpretation involves 
issues of considerable public controversy, and Congress has not acted to 
correct any misperception of its statutory objectives.”197  Since FDA had not 
previously made exceptions from its approval process for drugs used by the 
terminally ill, the Court noted its reluctance “to disturb a longstanding 
 
 190. Id. at 552. 
 191. Id. at 548. 
 192. Id. at 554–55.  The district court had determined that the record supported the decision of 
the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration that laetrile was a new drug under 
§ 201(p)(1) of the FDCA and that laetrile was not exempted from the requirements of the FDCA 
under a 1938 grandfather clause.  Id. at 550.  The district court then determined that the record did 
not support the Commissioner’s determination that laetrile was not exempted from the 
requirements of the FDCA under a 1962 grandfather clause and found that laetrile was exempt 
under that clause.  Id.  The district court alternately held that “denying cancer patients the right to 
use a nontoxic substance in connection with their personal health” violated the patients’ 
constitutional privacy rights.  Id.  However, the court of appeals did not address the statutory or 
constitutional determinations and instead held that “the ‘safety’ and ‘effectiveness’ terms used in 
the statute have no reasonable application to terminally ill cancer patients.”  Id. at 550–51.  
Therefore, the court only addressed the question of whether the safety and effectiveness terms of 
the FDCA applied to terminally ill patients. 
 193. Id. at 552. 
 194. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 555. 
 195. Id. at 559. 
 196. Id. at 553. 
 197. Id. at 554. 
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administrative policy that comports with the plain language, history, and 
prophylactic purpose of the Act.”198 
Access to potentially life-saving drugs was also the issue in Abigail 
Alliance.  In Abigail Alliance, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision was 
an en banc reversal of their previous panel decision.199  In the panel decision, 
the court held that there was a constitutional right of access to experimental 
drugs for terminally ill patients.200  The court found that where terminally ill 
adults had no other government-approved treatment options, those patients’ 
rights to obtain investigational drugs that had passed Phase 1 of the FDA 
approval process were protected by the Due Process Clause.201  The court 
distinguished the case from Rutherford, noting that laetrile, the drug at issue in 
Rutherford, had not yet cleared Phase 1.202  Therefore, in Rutherford the 
government presented a more compelling interest in denying the public access 
to the drug, as it had not yet been determined if laetrile was poisonous and 
FDA had not yet approved the drug for basic human testing.203  The court in 
the Abigail Alliance panel decision, however, determined that the 
government’s interest in denying public access to investigational drugs was 
weaker because these drugs had passed Phase 1 studies and were deemed safe 
for expanded human testing.204  Thus, in its panel decision, the Abigail 
Alliance court found that the government’s interest in protecting the public 
infringed upon an individual’s liberty to receive investigational drugs.205 
IV.  REASONING OF THE COURT IN THE EN BANC ABIGAIL ALLIANCE DECISION 
The dispute in the panel and en banc Abigail Alliance decisions was the 
same: the right of access to investigational drugs for terminally ill patients.206  
These patients and their spouses demanded access to drugs that had passed 
Phase 1 of the FDA approval process.207  A drug that FDA permits to pass 
Phase 1 is considered safe and promising enough for expanded human 
testing.208  The Alliance asserted that the right of the terminally ill to have 
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access to drugs that have passed Phase 1 was protected by the Due Process 
Clause.209  As such, the Alliance argued that the FDA regulations “preventing 
access to experimental drugs for terminally ill patients where there is 
insufficient evidence of effectiveness or where there is an unreasonable risk of 
injury” and “prohibiting drug manufacturers from profiting on the sale of 
experimental drugs” should be subjected to strict scrutiny for interfering with a 
fundamental constitutional right.210 
The Alliance argued that the regulations violated the Constitution by 
interfering with the rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.211  Under the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”212  As noted by the court, 
the Supreme Court has interpreted the rights protected under the Due Process 
Clause to be subject to strict scrutiny.213  Additionally, as the rights protected 
by the Due Process Clause are not delineated in the Constitution, the court said 
that it was cautioned by the Supreme Court to limit expanding those rights.214 
According to the court in Abigail Alliance, the Supreme Court’s 
“established method of substantive-due-process analysis” has two requirements 
that must be met for a right to be recognized as protected under the Due 
Process Clause.215  These two requirements emerged from the Court’s decision 
in Washington v. Glucksberg.216  The court in Abigail Alliance noted that the 
first requirement is that a right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty 
nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”217  The second requirement is 
that a request for judicial recognition of a due process right provides “a careful 
description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.”218 
The court assumed arguendo that the Alliance met the careful description 
requirement and focused on whether the Alliance was able to prove that the 
Alliance’s asserted right to drugs for terminally ill patients was sufficiently 
supported by “our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices.”219  The 
court noted that the Alliance’s claim for constitutional protection rested on two 
arguments: first, that “common law and historical American practices have 
traditionally trusted individual doctors and their patients with almost complete 
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autonomy to evaluate the efficacy of medical treatments” and second, that the 
current FDA regulations are “inconsistent with the way that our legal tradition 
treats persons in all other life-threatening situations.”220 
To support its first argument, the Alliance noted that the government did 
not interfere with doctors’ judgments about the efficacy of drugs until the 
FDCA was amended in 1962 to include the current FDA approval process.221  
The court dismissed this analysis, noting that the Alliance ignored the 
“Nation’s history of regulating the safety of drugs.”222  The court examined the 
Nation’s early state regulation of drugs, finding that Virginia had regulated 
drugs due to safety concerns as early as 1736 and at least twenty-five states or 
territories had regulated impure drugs by 1870.223  The court also noted several 
examples of federal government intervention in the drug market, beginning 
with the Import Drug Act of 1848 that banned “imported adulterated drugs.”224  
The court found that the Nation’s history did include regulation of drugs for 
safety, and the court noted that some of that regulation did involve regulation 
of drug efficacy.225 
Even allowing that perhaps the Nation’s history did not show a tradition of 
regulating drug efficacy, the court still found the Alliance’s argument 
unpersuasive.226  As the court noted, “an arguably limited history of efficacy 
regulation . . . does not establish a fundamental right of access to unproven 
drugs.”227  Such a limited history of governmental regulation, if alone used to 
establish a lack of a traditional governmental interference, could support 
“sweeping claims of fundamental rights.”228 Limited history of regulation is 
evidence that a right may be “deeply rooted” under the Glucksberg analysis, 
but such history does not automatically point to constitutional protection.229 
The Alliance also argued that several common law doctrines supported its 
argument that restricting access to investigational drugs for the terminally ill 
violated the rights of the terminally ill.230  The Alliance argued that the 
doctrine of necessity, the tort of intentional interference with rescue, and the 
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right to self-defense all lent support to its position.231  The Alliance asserted 
that the right of self-preservation present in each common law doctrine would 
give the terminally ill the right to use drugs that had been preliminarily judged 
safe enough for expanded human testing and promising enough to potentially 
save the patients’ lives.232  The court found that each common law doctrine 
failed as an analogy to the situation in Abigail Alliance, and the court felt that 
none of the doctrines aided the Alliance’s position.233 
The court ultimately found the Alliance’s argument for access to 
experimental drugs for the terminally ill unsupported.234  The court noted that 
the Alliance had not shown that the right to use experimental drugs was deeply 
rooted in the Nation’s history.235  The court felt that the Alliance had not 
shown that the Nation’s legal traditions, as evidenced by several common law 
doctrines, justified allowing citizens a constitutional right to drugs that had not 
yet been deemed acceptable for public use.236  The court held that the Alliance 
failed to meet the requirements for a fundamental constitutional right under the 
Supreme Court’s Glucksberg analysis.237 
Since the right sought by the Alliance was not fundamental, the court 
found that it was only required to subject the right sought to rational basis 
scrutiny.238  Under the rational basis test, the Alliance was required to prove 
that the government’s restriction on the right asserted had no rational 
relationship to a legitimate state interest.239  The court found the Alliance could 
not show the regulations challenged had no rational relationship to a legitimate 
state interest, as the government does have a valid interest in having a 
minimum amount of knowledge about the benefits and risks of a drug and in 
preventing citizens from receiving drugs for which the government does not 
yet have such minimum knowledge.240  Although the Alliance suggested that 
the government’s safety concerns do not apply to terminally ill patients willing 
to accept the risks associated with investigational drugs, the court found that 
argument unpersuasive.241  The court in Abigail Alliance held that “FDA’s 
policy of limiting access to investigational drugs is rationally related to the 
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legitimate state interest of protecting patients, including the terminally ill, from 
potentially unsafe drugs with unknown therapeutic effects.”242 
The dissent in Abigail Alliance was authored by Judge Judith Rogers, the 
author of the majority opinion in the previous panel decision.243  The dissent 
was joined by Chief Judge Douglas Ginsberg, the other member of the 
majority in the panel decision.244  According to the dissenters, “the court 
fundamentally misunderstands the right claimed by the Alliance and trivially 
casts it as a function of the regulatory scheme.”245 
Judge Rogers and Chief Judge Ginsberg found fault with the majority’s 
application of the Glucksberg analysis and found the majority opinion to 
contain a “stunning misunderstanding of the stakes.”246  The dissent recast the 
Glucksberg historical inquiry into the Nation’s traditions as an investigation 
not of governmental regulation of safety but of the right of self-preservation.247  
The dissent found that the Alliance had shown a deeply rooted right under 
Glucksberg.248  Based on the common law doctrines of self-defense, necessity, 
and intentional interference with rescue and congressional deference to those 
doctrines, the dissent found that there was a deeply rooted tradition in the 
Nation’s history of protecting life by authorizing attempts to save it.249 
The dissent also criticized the majority’s reasoning in determining that a 
historical absence of governmental regulation does not alone demonstrate that 
a right is not fundamental.250  The court found that conclusion unsupported by 
the Supreme Court, which has concluded that a right does not have to be 
explicitly acknowledged by legislation to be considered “deeply rooted,” and 
unheeding of the second prong of the Glucksberg analysis, which requires 
specificity in claiming a fundamental right.251  The dissent found that shifting 
the inquiry to governmental safety regulation as opposed to governmental 
efficacy regulation avoided the sparse history of efficacy regulation.252  The 
dissent felt the Alliance presented adequate evidence of the common law 
doctrines promoting preservation of life and a national history of access to 
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experimental drugs to meet the first requirement for a fundamental right under 
Glucksberg.253 
The dissent continued to apply the Glucksberg analysis to the fundamental 
right claimed by the Alliance.254  The court moved on through the first prong 
of Glucksberg, evaluating whether the right to investigational drugs for the 
terminally ill was “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither 
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”255  In doing so, the 
dissent found that the right sought by the Alliance was bound up with the 
notion of liberty.256  The dissent noted that the “[t]he core of liberty is 
autonomy,” and that current FDA policy violated the self-determination of 
terminally ill individuals.257  The dissent also found that the second prong of 
the Glucksberg analysis, the “careful description of the asserted fundamental 
liberty interest,” was satisfied by the Alliance: “the Alliance’s liberty claims 
are not grounded in the abstract notion of personal autonomy but rather in the 
specific right to act to save one’s own life.”258 
The dissent believed that the Alliance’s claimed fundamental right of 
access to investigational drugs for the terminally ill passed the Glucksberg 
test.259  The dissent felt the case should be remanded for a determination of 
whether the government can present a compelling enough reason to satisfy the 
strict scrutiny test, thereby justifying the fact that the current FDA approval 
process infringes on the fundamental constitutional rights of the terminally 
ill.260 
V.  A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S DECISION IN ABIGAIL ALLIANCE 
AND ITS APPLICATION TO STATE MEDICAL FUTILITY STATUTES 
In Abigail Alliance, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals refused to recognize 
a constitutional right for the terminally ill to obtain a promising drug not yet 
available to the general public.261  The court upheld FDA’s right to adhere to 
the current approval process regulations, passed by the agency under the 
FDCA.262  Under these regulations, a drug cannot be offered to the general 
public until extensive studies have established its safety and efficacy.263  In 
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Abigail Alliance, the court affirmed that the government can restrict the 
public’s access to drug treatments through agency-created regulation enacted 
under limiting legislation.264 
Medical futility statutes seem to operate in a similar fashion, and should 
therefore seem to be subject to similar deference by the courts.  Under current 
state futility statutes, a health care provider can restrict a patient’s access to 
medical treatment if the provider feels the treatment sought falls into some 
category of medical inappropriateness.  The state legislature sets the limits for 
access to treatment by passing medical futility statutes, which hospitals then 
enforce through their own regulations delineating what constitutes medical 
inappropriateness.  It would seem that the hospital regulatory decisions should 
be subjective to the same judicial deference as FDA’s regulatory decisions. 
Determinations of futility under current medical futility statutes are 
undeserving of the level of judicial respect that the court showed the FDA 
regulations in Abigail Alliance and that courts have generally shown FDA 
regulations when those regulations have been questioned.  FDA is the 
intermediary enforcing the FDCA.  An individual hospital is the intermediary 
enforcing a state medical futility statute.  The court in Abigail Alliance 
affirmed the regulations passed by FDA—an administrative agency—to 
enforce the FDCA; a court affirming a medical futility decision would be 
deferring to the unique determinations of a single hospital under a state 
medical futility statute. 
While the promulgation of FDA regulations requires the input of a wide 
range of parties with varying areas of expertise on a national scale, a medical 
futility determination involves the value judgments of a handful of individuals 
with the same medical background from the same locality.  Since there is no 
consensus on what constitutes medical futility, hospital determinations of 
futility can vary widely.  A state employing a futility statute that uses a clinical 
definition of futility entrusts interpretation of the controversial term “medical 
inappropriateness” to a single doctor or hospital.  A state employing a process-
based futility statute depends on a single hospital’s ethics committee to 
determine what constitutes medical inappropriateness.  In either situation, a 
determination of futility is made largely, if not completely, by medical 
personnel with no input from the non-medical community.  In a medical 
futility dispute, which pits the wishes of a patient’s family to prolong life 
against the evaluation of the patient’s doctor that the life is not worth 
prolonging, consideration of the non-medical values that a family may attach 
to a life should not be ignored. 
Medical futility decisions do not have procedural safeguards built in that 
are equivalent to the administrative regulation approval process.  FDA 
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regulations undergo an extensive evaluation process.265  This process also 
helps to ensure that the regulations achieve the objectives of the statute 
authorizing them and that the regulations are worthy of substantial judicial 
deference.266  A hospital’s futility determination, if made under a state futility 
statute, is not subject to any oversight.  While a clinical definition statute may 
encourage a hospital to seek a provider willing to continue treatment 
considered inappropriate, and while a process-based statute requires such an 
inquiry, that investigation is limited to area hospitals to which transfer is 
possible.  A decision that treatment is futile is, at most, a local consensus 
among area hospitals that will not be further evaluated. 
Under either current conception of medical futility statute, the role of the 
courts has been steered away from the actual issue of futility.  Hospitals are 
reluctant to rely on medical futility statutes to unilaterally terminate care.  As a 
result, there are virtually no direct challenges to a decision to terminate 
treatment.  When medical futility disputes do involve the courts, courts are 
asked to look at such questions as the fitness of the surrogate or the possibility 
that medical decisions are preempted by federal regulation instead of directly 
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addressing the provider’s decision.  Cases that emerge from clinical definitions 
of futility, then, focus on issues other than the evaluation of futility under that 
definition.  Process-based futility statutes have extra protection to ensure that 
physicians’ decisions are consistent with current medical practice, but such 
statutes still vest substantive decisions in the hands of a few physicians and fail 
to offer adequate judicial recourse to those affected by the decisions.  As 
exhibited by Texas’s futility statute, the decision of the ethics committee can 
only be postponed to allow the patient’s surrogate to find another provider 
willing to offer care.  Under process-based futility statutes, a determination that 
treatment is futile cannot be attacked through the judicial process.  Medical 
futility statutes based on clinical definitions of futility offer no means of 
checking the discretion of a single doctor or hospital, and process-based futility 
statutes likewise do not permit the decisions of the ethics committee to be 
challenged on the merits.  Current state medical futility statutes remove courts 
entirely from the question of medical futility, and given that such decisions are 
made by only a handful of individuals, those adversely affected by the 
decisions should be permitted meaningful judicial recourse. 
If current state futility statutes offer inadequate judicial oversight of 
decisions that require overseeing, what possible alternatives exist?  If a 
medical futility determination is made pursuant to a hospital policy, the 
patient’s family may turn to the courts for relief based on the merits of their 
claim.  The history of medical futility has shown that hospitals are reluctant to 
make futility determinations based only on hospital policy, however, and the 
elimination of state legislation authorizing futility determinations would likely 
eliminate all unilateral decisionmaking by providers.  To preserve the ability of 
providers to terminate medically inappropriate care, the history of futility 
disputes has shown that medical futility statutes are required.  A new 
conception of a state futility statute is needed—one that takes into account a 
broader range of values than those of the doctors at a given hospital and one 
that gives courts a more meaningful role.  This Comment does not provide a 
ready solution and only argues that the current statutes are inadequate. 
Medical futility statutes and the FDA approval process are not permanently 
fixed, and both can be changed through the legislative process to take all 
relevant factors into account.  The court in Abigail Alliance leaves open the 
possibility that the current FDA screening process can be changed, if such 
changes are deemed appropriate.267  In fact, in response to Abigail Alliance, 
FDA has proposed new guidelines to allow terminally ill patients earlier access 
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to promising treatments.268  The medical futility debate likewise continues, as 
states have continued to revise their futility definitions.269  Given the interests 
at stake, the continuance of such debate about the value of life should always 
be encouraged and broadened to include as many viewpoints as possible. 
CONCLUSION 
The court in Abigail Alliance found that the Alliance had not proved that a 
right to use experimental drugs is guaranteed by the Constitution, and 
concluded that it should not “inject[ ] the courts into unknown questions of 
science and medicine.”270  Limitations on access to medical treatment exist at 
the state level as well, as states have recently enacted laws intended to allow 
health care providers to unilaterally terminate inappropriate medical treatment.  
The current system of state statutes is flawed, however, as individual hospitals 
are entrusted to make substantive decisions about the appropriateness of care 
for their patients.  The state statute model that commentators have begun to 
advocate then offers no opportunity to challenge a decision of medical futility 
on its merits.  Under current state statutes, the definition of “medically 
inappropriate” depends largely on what one group of local doctors believes it 
should mean.  These decisions should not be subject to the same deference as 
the court in Abigail Alliance gave the decisions of the FDA.  In Abigail 
Alliance, the court expressed a desire that “this debate among the Alliance, the 
FDA, the scientific and medical communities, and the public may continue 
through the democratic process.”271  As long as there is still the need for such 
debate about medical treatment, the courts should not blindly acquiesce to the 
judgment of a handful of clinicians whose opinions on morality, quality of life, 
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